REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND LAW IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

Abstract

This study investigates the nature of the relationship between Ethics and Law in the Metaphysics of Morals. It is based on a comparative analysis between three interpretations (thesis of independence, thesis of dependency and thesis of complementarity) and, from Kant's text, argues that the thesis of complementarity is the most defensible one. Moreover, this perspective is supported by another thesis regarding the issue of analyticity in Law. It states that, although the Law is analytically derived from external freedom, it should be complemented by a synthetic principle (the united will of the people) in order to remain within the system of the Metaphysics of Morals. We thus reach the conclusion that, despite his inconsistencies when dealing with the nature of ethical and legal duties, Kant understands Law and Ethics as two branches of the moral system that complement and describe the total mastery of practical reason in the context of human action, whether in the inner or outer sphere of freedom.