Deontological Ethics as na Obstacle to the Affirmation of the Individual: A Relationship between Kant and Nietzsche
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20911/21799024v16n2p59/2025Abstract
To conceive a creative ethics is to dismantle the fixation of morality. Creation requires an affirmation of the subject — Amor fati, an openness to becoming. In contrast, thought dogmatized by reason stiffens the creative act, as there is no subjective action — that is, no manifestation of instincts, the original state of the subject — but rather a vital negation, a denial of life as totality. Along this path, two thinkers will be addressed: Immanuel Kant (1804), with his “deontological” ethics grounded in reason as moral fixation, and Friedrich Nietzsche (1900), who envisions a creative ethics that experiences reality without prejudice or moral absolutism. Thus, the values of truth and ideals that domesticate human action and thought are rejected.
KEYWORDS: Ethics. Deontological. Creation. Life. Amor fati.
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